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This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal 
corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities. It is demonstrated that the optimal 
second-best tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal 
cost of public funds. The reason is that the marginal cost of public funds equals unity in the 
optimal tax system, since marginal distortions of taxation are equal to marginal distributional 
gains. The Pigouvian tax needs to be modified, however, if polluting commodities or 
environmental quality are more complementary to leisure than non-polluting commodities 
are. 
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Economists have been forceful advocates of the use of economic instruments, such as environ-
mental taxes, to control the emission of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, see, for recent,
examples Stern (2007), International Monetary Fund (2008) and Fullerton et al. (2010). Pigou
(1920) taught us that the optimal tax on externality-generating goods should be equal to the
marginal external damage from the consumption of that good. However, the optimality of the
Pigouvian tax has been challenged by the analysis of second-best. In particular, setting the
corrective tax at the Pigouvian level is no longer guaranteed to be optimal in the presence of
distortionary taxes.1
The optimal corrective tax should be equal to the marginal external damage divided by the
marginal cost of public funds – as long as uniform commodity taxes are optimal in the absence
of externalities.2 Providing a better environmental quality is more costly if larger public revenue
requirements result in greater labor-tax distortions. The reason is that, it is not optimal, from
a revenue-raising perspective, to distort the composition of consumption with pollution taxes,
even if tax revenues are recycled in the form of lower tax rates on labor income. By distorting
the composition of consumption, environmental taxes exacerbate pre-existing distortions of the
labor tax in the labor market. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) thus conclude “... In the presence
of preexisting distortionary taxes, the optimal pollution tax typically lies below the Pigouvian
tax, which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pollution. Intuitively, the collective
good of environmental quality directly competes with other collective goods. Hence, the marginal
costs of environmental policy rise with the marginal cost of public funds” (p. 1085).
This paper argues that these second-best results are ﬂawed. The main problem in the
literature is that second-best corrective taxes are analyzed in Ramsey-type models assuming a
representative agent. Some exceptions are discussed below. Only by artiﬁcially ruling out lump-
sum taxes does the optimal tax problem become second-best in nature. Often, this assumption
is justiﬁed by referring to distributional issues that are associated with levying lump-sum taxes.
If every agent is identical, however, there is no distributional problem and no economic reason
why lump-sum taxes should not be feasible in such settings.
The analysis in this paper explicitly incorporates redistributional concerns by allowing for
heterogenous agents. Agents diﬀer in their earnings ability, which is private information. This
paper thereby extends the analyses of Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) with
externalities in the consumption of certain commodities. Individualized lump-sum taxes are
not feasible, as the government can observe neither individual earnings ability nor labor eﬀort.
Informational constraints thus impose limits on the redistributive powers of the government.
1Research on environmental taxes in second-best settings is discussed and summarized in Goulder (1995),
Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), Bovenberg (1999), Sandmo (2000), Goulder and Bovenberg (2002), and Fullerton
et al. (2010).
2Commodity taxes should optimally be diﬀerentiated for non-environmental reasons if some commodities are
more complementary to leisure than others. Setting higher taxes on goods that are complementary to leisure
alleviates tax distortions on labor supply, cf. Corlett and Hague (1953) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).
Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b) demonstrate that for general utility functions the
optimal environmental tax is a weighted average of a Pigouvian term and a Corrlett–Hague term. With weak
separability of labor from other commodities in the utility function, and homothetic sub-utility over commodities,
optimal commodity taxes should not be diﬀerentiated for non-environmental reasons, so that the Corlett–Hague
term vanishes, see Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b).
2The government therefore needs to resort to taxing observable labor income and commodity
demand in order to achieve its redistributive goals. Tax distortions thus arise endogenously
from the redistributive preferences of the government. Nevertheless, the government can always
employ non-distortionary, non-individualized lump-sum taxes. Intuitively, non-individualized
lump-sum taxes are always incentive-compatible, and should therefore be part of the instrument
set of the government. Hence, in the absence of any distributional concerns, the government
relies exclusively on this non-distortionary source of ﬁnance to meet its revenue requirements.
This paper explores whether the optimal environmental tax should be modiﬁed in the second-
best compared to the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax, which perfectly internalizes all externalities. It
also analyzes how the optimal provision of environmental quality deviates from its ﬁrst-best
rule in second-best settings. The main result of this paper is that the rules for the optimal
second-best environmental tax and the optimal provision of environmental quality should not
be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds. Consequently, optimal corrective taxes
should not be lowered if public resources are scarcer due to a higher level of labor-income
taxation. In the optimal tax system, the marginal cost of public funds equals one also in the
second-best. Taxes are distortionary, but in the optimal tax system the deadweight losses are
exactly oﬀset by the welfare gains of a more equal welfare distribution. The ﬁnding that the
marginal cost of public funds equals one is a statement about the optimality of the tax system.
At the optimum, the marginal unit of tax revenue should be valued equally by the government
and the private sector. Thus, a better environmental quality no longer competes with other
public goods. Consequently, models that assume a representative agent produce misleading
conclusions regarding the desirability of corrective taxes because they ignore the distributional
gains associated with distortionary taxes.
This analysis, furthermore, derives the optimal second-best corrective tax, – what is referred
to as the ‘modiﬁed Pigouvian tax’ – which contains some modiﬁcations in comparison with the
ﬁrst-best Pigouvian corrective tax. By allowing for general preference structures, which would
imply diﬀerentiated commodity taxes in the absence of externalities, the analysis demonstrates
that if environmental taxes alleviate (exacerbate) labor-market distortions, then optimal envi-
ronmental taxes should be set higher (lower) for non-environmental concerns. Moreover, when
the income tax is restricted to be linear, the tax on polluting consumption should optimally be
used for redistributional reasons alongside the income tax. In particular, if the polluting com-
modity is consumed relatively more by the rich (poor), then the optimal tax on the polluting
commodity should be higher (lower). This redistributive role of environmental policy disappears
if the government has access to a non-linear income tax.3
Optimal non-linear pollution taxes are derived alongside the optimal non-linear income tax
so as to explore the conditions under which a ﬂat-rate pollution tax is optimal. It is shown that
ﬂat pollution taxes are indeed optimal and equal to the Pigouvian tax under two relatively mild
conditions. First, the social marginal damage of consuming one unit of the polluting consumption
good should be constant across individuals. And, second, preferences of individuals should be
weakly separable between commodities and labor supply.
3This result depends on the assumption that preferences are identical – an assumption that is made throughout
the paper. Saez (2002) shows that when there is preference heterogeneity in the demand for commodities, higher
taxes are levied on commodities for which the skilled have a higher marginal willingness to pay.
3Finally, the analysis derives exact conditions on the utility structure that ensure that the
optimal second-best environmental tax equals the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax. In particular, when
non-linear policy instruments are available, labor and commodities should be weakly separable in
utility. However, when only linear tax instruments are available, then not only weak separability
is required, but also linear Engel curves in the demand for dirty commodities (homotheticity
in utility over dirty and clean consumption goods), and the absence of income eﬀects (quasi-
linearity of utility). This latter case most clearly demonstrates the importance of distributional
concerns to motivate tax distortions. While satisfying the conditions for the absence of Corlett–
Hague motives, the optimal corrective tax no longer contains a correction for the marginal cost
of public funds, as in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b), even though taxes are distortionary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses how this paper
relates to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 derives the optimal tax system
under linear policy instruments. Section 5 does the same under non-linear instruments. Section
6 derives the policy implications from the analysis, and Section 7 concludes. The Appendix
contains some technical derivations.
2 Relation to the literature
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, it is the optimal-tax complement to
Kaplow (2006), where the income tax is not necessarily optimized. Kaplow (2006) shows that
tax distortions arising from the income tax need not play a role in the second-best policy rule for
the optimal corrective tax if the government can design beneﬁt-absorbing changes in the non-
linear income tax schedule that perfectly neutralize the distributional impact of environmental
taxes. By assuming weakly separable preferences between labor supply and other commodities,
such a beneﬁt-absorbing tax change does not generate incentive eﬀects on labor supply, see
also Laroque (2005), Gahvari (2006) and Jacobs (2009). Hence, the beneﬁt-absorbing change
in the tax schedule perfectly imitates a pure beneﬁt tax, so that neither labor tax distortions
nor distributional eﬀects should aﬀect the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax.4 In contrast, this paper
derives explicit expressions for optimal environmental and income taxes. If preferences are
weakly separable, then the optimal second-best environmental tax is shown to correspond to the
Pigouvian tax, even without adjusting the tax schedule to neutralize the distributional impact
of the environmental tax. In addition, this paper derives the optimal tax structure under linear
instruments, which is not explored by Kaplow. Optimal environmental taxes and environmental
quality should then take into account also their impacts on the income distribution. Finally,
the nature of non-separabilities in preferences for optimal environmental policies in second-best
is analytically explored. With non-separable preferences, beneﬁt-absorbing changes in the tax
schedule generally aﬀect labor-supply incentives (see also Laroque (2005) and Jacobs (2009)).
It is shown that the optimal second-best environmental tax then deviates from the ﬁrst-best
Pigouvian tax.
Second, this paper contributes to the analysis of Pirttilä (2000). By adopting the private
4Kaplow (2006) is related to the arguments provided in Kaplow (1996), Kaplow (2004), Laroque (2005) and
Gauthier and Laroque (2009), who analyze distortionary taxation and optimal public goods provision (rather
than externalities).
4marginal value of income as an approximation to the social marginal value of income, Pirttilä
(2000) ﬁnds that the optimal environmental tax should be corrected for the marginal cost of
public funds. Following Jacobs (2010), this paper uses a diﬀerent and economically more ap-
pealing deﬁnition for the marginal cost of public funds, which is based on the social marginal
value of income of Diamond (1975). It is demonstrated that the marginal cost of public funds
should not play a role in the optimal second-best policy rules for corrective taxes. Moreover,
this paper derives not only clear-cut analytical characterizations for optimal linear income and
corrective taxes are derived, but also the conditions are derived under which the optimal linear
corrective tax corresponds to the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax in the second-best.
Third, the analysis of this paper generalizes Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), Cremer et al.
(1998), and Micheletto (2008). These authors also extend the analysis of Mirrlees (1971) and
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) with externalities by exploring the properties of optimal tax rules
with respect to the preferences of individuals.5 However, these authors restrict the pollution tax
to be linear, whereas this paper allows for optimal non-linear pollution taxes. The extension to
non-linear pollution taxes requires that the government is able to verify individual consumption
levels of polluting goods. For many consumption goods this assumption could be diﬃcult to
justify. However, for a number of important polluting goods it is, in fact, feasible to levy non-
linear taxes. A real-world example can be found in the Netherlands where the government levies
a non-linear energy tax based on individual energy consumption (i.e., electricity and gas).6 It is
demonstrated that the optimal non-linear pollution tax is a ﬂat-rate tax as long as preferences are
weakly separable between labor and consumption of polluting and non-polluting goods and the
marginal social damage of pollution is constant across individuals. These conditions appear to be
rather weak. Furthermore, Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), Cremer et al. (1998), and Micheletto
(2008) include all incentive compatibility constraints as separate constraints to the optimal
tax problem, which makes it rather diﬃcult to analytically derive general properties of optimal
environmental tax schedules. In contrast, this paper obtains explicit and simple second-best non-
linear decision rules in terms of behavioral elasticities, which can be estimated from observed
behavior.
3 Model
This paper employs a static model that consists of heterogeneous individuals and a government.
Individuals maximize utility by supplying labor and consuming non-polluting (‘clean’) and pol-
luting (‘dirty’) commodities. The government maximizes social welfare by setting income and
commodity taxes on the dirty good. Without loss of generality, a partial equilibrium setting
5Cremer et al. (1998) assume that environmental quality is separable from other commodities. This paper
allows environmental quality to directly enter utility functions without imposing any form of separability, like in
Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997).
6In 2010, the Dutch government levies a graduated tax of 0.1629 euro/m
3 for gas use below 5000 m
3 per year
until 0.0116 euro/m
3 for non-business users using more than 10,000,000 m
3 of gas per year. Similarly, there is
a tax of 0.1114 euro/kWh on electricity use below 10,000 kWh, which declines to 0.0010 euro for non-businesses
using more than 10,000,000 kWh per year. Moreover, there a tax credit of 318 euro for electricity, see Dutch
Ministry of Finance (2010).
5is assumed in which prices are ﬁxed.7 The model is introduced under the assumption of linear
policy instruments. Formally, the informational assumptions for this instrument set are that
the government is able to observe aggregate labor incomes and aggregate consumption of dirty
goods. Later, this assumption is dropped by allowing for non-linear instruments, which require
observability of labor earnings and consumption of dirty goods at the individual level.
3.1 Households
There is a total mass of individuals equal to N. Individuals may diﬀer by a one-dimensional
parameter n 2 N = [n;n]. n is used to denote the individual’s earning ability (‘skill level’). All
labor types are assumed to be perfect substitutes in aggregate production. As a result, the wage
rate per eﬃciency unit of skill is constant and normalized to unity. The density of individual
types with index n is denoted by f(n) and the cumulative distribution function by F(n). All
individual-speciﬁc variables are indexed with subscript n.
Each individual n derives utility from non-polluting commodities cn, polluting commodi-
ties qn, and a better environmental quality E. In addition, the individual derives disutility
from supplying labor ln. The utility function un is strictly quasi-concave and identical across
individuals:
un  u(cn;qn;ln;E); uc;uq; ul;uE > 0; ucc;ull;uqq;uEE < 0; 8n: (1)
The subscripts refer to the argument of diﬀerentiation, except where the subscript denotes ability
n. All goods are assumed to be non-inferior. It is assumed that the utility function satisﬁes the
single-crossing conditions, which are needed to implement non-linear taxes, see also section 5
and the Appendix. In addition, we assume that the marginal utility of income is decreasing.8
However, no further structure on the cross derivatives of the utility function is imposed. Hence,
this utility speciﬁcation allows for general cross-substitution patterns between consumption of
clean and dirty goods, labor supply and environmental quality.
Households spend their net labor earnings and government transfers on consumption of clean
and dirty goods. Gross labor earnings nln are subject to tax rate t, polluting goods qn are subject
to tax rate , and individuals receive a non-individualized lump-sum transfer T. The individual
budget constraint therefore reads as follows:
cn + (1 + )qn = (1   t)nln + T; 8n: (2)
Given the presumed absence of non-labor incomes, the tax on the clean commodity is re-
dundant, and, therefore, set to zero.9 Each individual maximizes utility subject to the budget
7Almost all of the papers in the literature ﬁx the marginal rates of transformation between all commodities at
one. Hence, all prices are constant, and allowing for general equilibrium provides no additional insights, see e.g.,
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b). Moreover, the partial equilibrium
results fully generalize to general equilibrium settings with non-constant prices, since optimal second-best tax
rules in general equilibrium are identical to the ones in partial equilibrium as long as there are constant returns
to scale in production and all labor types are perfect substitutes, see also Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
8This requires the utility function to display decreasing returns to scale in all its arguments.
9Fullerton (1997) shows that the alternative normalization with a zero labor tax raises the optimal commodity
taxes on clean and dirty consumption in a uniform way (which is equivalent to an income tax).
6constraint. Households take environmental quality E as given when deciding on their consump-
tion plans. Consumption of dirty commodities causes a classical negative externality in a manner
that is delineated below.




= (1   t)n; 8n; (3)
uq
uc
= 1 + ; 8n: (4)
The marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption in equation (3) equals the
net wage rate. A larger tax rate on labor earnings induces substitution towards leisure. This is
distortionary, since the tax drives a wedge between the social marginal beneﬁt and the private
marginal beneﬁt of an hour of work eﬀort. According to equation (4), the individual optimally
decides upon the allocation of resources between dirty and clean consumption goods. A higher
tax on dirty goods harms non-environmental welfare by distorting the optimal composition of
consumption as a result of substitution towards the consumption of clean commodities.
The indirect utility function is designated by vn (T;t;;E)  u

^ cn; ^ qn;^ ln;E

, 8n, where
hats denote optimized values of each commodity and labor supply. Application of Roy’s lemma
produces the following derivatives of the indirect utility function: @vn
@T = n, @vn
@t =  nnln,
@vn
@ =  nqn, and @vn
@E = n
uE
uc , 8n, where n stands for the private marginal utility of income.
3.2 Environmental quality
Environmental quality (E) is modeled as a pure public good. In particular, environmental
quality is speciﬁed as a linear function of aggregate consumption of dirty goods:
E  E0   N
Z
N
qndF(n);  > 0; (5)
where E0 denotes the exogenously given initial stock of environmental quality. The linearity of
the speciﬁcation for environmental quality is without loss of generality, since the utility function
features diminishing marginal utility of environmental quality. The latter assumption ensures
increasing social marginal damage from pollution. Alternatively, one can also interpret equation
(5) as the production technology of environmental quality.
3.3 Government





	(un)dF(n); 	0 (un) > 0; 	00 (un)  0: (6)
If 	0 (un) = 1, the social welfare function is utilitarian. If 	0 (un) = 0, except for the lowest skill
level, the social welfare function is Rawlsian.
10Strict quasi-concavity of the utility function ensures that second-order conditions for a maximum are fulﬁlled.
7Total tax revenues from the labor income tax and the dirt tax should be equal to total





(tnln + qn)dF(n) = NT + R: (7)
4 Optimal linear taxation
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare is given by (where the whole expression has been
























where the Lagrange multiplier  denotes the marginal social value of public resources and the
Lagrange multiplier  denotes the marginal social cost per capita (measured in social welfare
units) of providing a better environmental quality E.
The optimization program (8) is solved for the optimal linear taxes on labor income and the
optimal tax on polluting goods. Moreover, environmental quality E is employed as a separate
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dF(n) = 0; (12)
where the derivatives of the indirect utility function are used in each expression.11
In the rest of this section, the optimal income tax, the optimal environmental tax, and the
optimal provision of environmental quality are derived by employing the Slutsky equations for











































@E . To compute the income eﬀect of the change in environmental quality,
the property has been used that uE
uc measures the marginal change in (virtual) income when
environmental quality improves by one unit, see Wildasin (1984).
11We always assume that the solution to the optimal tax problem is interior and that second-order conditions
are met.
84.1 Marginal cost of public funds
The marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is deﬁned as the ratio between social marginal value of
one unit of public income () and the average of the social marginal value of one unit of private
income. The traditional literature on the marginal cost of public funds generally takes 	0n as a
measure for the social marginal value of private income of individual n (see, for example, Pirttilä
(2000)). Consequently, the traditional measure for the marginal cost of public funds is deﬁned
as MCF  = , where   
R
N 	0ndF(n). Jacobs (2009) and Jacobs (2010) demonstrate that
this traditional deﬁnition of the marginal cost of public funds suﬀers from three major defects.
First, the traditional marginal cost of public funds for lump-sum taxes is generally not equal
to one. In particular, a higher lump-sum tax stimulates labor supply if leisure is a normal good.
Hence, if labor income is taxed at a positive rate, a larger lump-sum tax raises revenues from
the income tax. Consequently, under the standard deﬁnition, the marginal cost of public funds
for the lump-sum tax is smaller than one (cf. Wilson (1991) and Sandmo (1998)).
Second, the marginal cost of public funds for the distortionary labor income tax is not directly
related to the excess burden of the tax. The marginal cost of public funds measure increases in
the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, which does not fully reﬂect the distortionary
impact of the tax, due to the presence of income eﬀects. Indeed, the marginal cost of public
funds of the distortionary tax could even be smaller than one if there is a backward-bending
labor-supply curve, cf. Atkinson and Stern (1974) and Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
Third, the marginal cost of public funds is highly sensitive to the normalization of the tax
system. Jacobs (2010) shows that, for identical allocations, the marginal cost of public funds
for the lump-sum tax switches from a number smaller than one to a number larger than one
if consumption is taxed instead of income. The reason is that if consumption is a normal
good, a higher lump-sum tax reduces tax revenues from consumption taxes. Moreover, the
marginal cost of public funds for the consumption tax is unambiguously larger than one, since
the uncompensated elasticity of consumption demand is always negative. Intuitively, income and
substitution eﬀects of consumption taxes reinforce each other. Thus, at identical allocations,
the marginal cost of public funds of a consumption tax is always larger than the marginal cost
of public funds of an income tax.
These ﬁndings point to a problematic concept of the marginal cost of public funds, which
renders its usefulness for both theory and applied analysis doubtful. Nevertheless, these problems
disappear if the income eﬀects on taxed bases and environmental welfare are included in the
deﬁnition for the marginal social value of private income. Intuitively, the social value of a
marginal unit of private income should capture all eﬀects of transferring a marginal unit of
resources from the public to the private sector. Thus, as Diamond (1975) proposes, the indirect
(income) eﬀects of lump-sum taxes on taxed bases should be included in the social value of
private income, and not only the direct eﬀect on private utility (	0n).
Deﬁnition 1 The social marginal value of transferring a marginal unit of income to individual
n is deﬁned as

n  	0n + tn
@ln
@T





n gives the net increase in social welfare (measured in social utils) of transferring a marginal
9unit of resources to person n. Note that 
n consists of four elements. First, when the individual
receives a marginal unit of income his private welfare rises by n, and social welfare thus increases
by 	0n. This is the traditional measure of the social value of private income. Second, an
individual receiving a marginal unit of income reduces labor supply as long as leisure is a normal
good. If labor income is taxed (t > 0), lower labor supply reduces tax revenues. This results
in a reduction of social welfare by tn@ln
@T . Third, by receiving a marginal unit of income, the
individual will consume more dirty commodities if the dirty commodity is a normal good. If
dirty commodities are taxed ( > 0), the government receives more revenues, and social welfare
expands by 
@qn
@T . Finally, the social value of a unit of private income should subtract the
value of the larger environmental damage arising from a larger demand for dirty commodities,
as represented by 
@qn
@T .
The deﬁnition of the marginal cost of public funds is thus given by the following:




Armed with the Diamond (1975) deﬁnition of the social marginal value of income, the ﬁrst
main result of the paper can be established:
Proposition 1 The marginal cost of public funds in the optimal linear tax system is equal to
one:
MCF = 1: (14)
Proof. Substituting deﬁnition 2 for MCF in the ﬁrst-order condition of the lump-sum transfer
in equation (9) yields the result.
The government thus sets the average resource cost of the lump-sum transfer (unity) equal
to the average social welfare gain expressed in monetary units of the transfer:  =. This result
demonstrates that representative-agent models, which yield a marginal cost of public funds
larger than one, need reconsideration. Allowing for redistributional concerns has two important
consequences. First, at the margin, the government always has access to a non-distortionary
source of ﬁnance. This source of ﬁnance is arbitrarily ruled out in representative-agent models.
However, by allowing for a non-distortionary marginal source of ﬁnance, the marginal cost
of public funds for this instrument is one in the optimal tax system. Second, all other tax
instruments must then have a marginal cost of public funds equal to one as well, since an
optimal tax system equates the marginal cost of public funds across all instruments. As a result,
the marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes should be exactly compensated by the social
marginal beneﬁts of redistribution or a higher environmental quality, see below.
4.2 Optimal income tax
To derive the optimal income tax from equation (10), the Feldstein (1972) distributional cha-
racteristic of the labor income tax base is introduced.
Deﬁnition 3 The distributional characteristic of labor income is










10l corresponds to the normalized covariance of earnings of individual n (nln), and the net
social welfare weight 
n of individual n. l measures the marginal gain in social welfare (in
monetary equivalents), expressed as a percentage of taxed labor income, of raising revenue via
the tax on labor income. The distributional characteristic is positive because the covariance
between labor earnings and welfare weights is negative.12 Individuals with higher incomes fea-
ture lower welfare weights because of diminishing social marginal utility of income. This is
caused by diminishing private marginal utility of income and the concavity of the social welfare
function. A positive distributional characteristic l therefore implies that taxing labor income
yields distributional beneﬁts. A stronger social preference for redistribution increases the distri-
butional characteristic. Similarly, more pre-tax inequality in labor earnings raises the demand
for redistribution. A zero distributional characteristic is obtained either if the government is not
interested in redistribution and attaches the same welfare weight 
n to all n, or if taxable income
nln is the same for all n so that there is no inequality. The distributional characteristic reaches
a maximum of one with the strongest possible distributional concerns, i.e., if the government
has Rawlsian social preferences.
The compensated elasticities of labor supply and dirty consumption with respect to the










qn . The direct tax elasticity
of labor supply "lt is unambiguously negative, i.e., higher taxes reduce labor supply due to
substituting leisure for consumption. The cross-tax elasticity of dirty consumption cannot be
signed unambiguously13. If dirty consumption is complementary to leisure, higher income taxes
will stimulate dirty consumption, i.e., "qt > 0. If dirty consumption is a substitute for leisure,
income taxes will reduce dirty consumption, i.e., "qt < 0.14 Further, n 
(1+)qn
(1 t)nln is deﬁned
as the net expenditure share of dirty commodities in net labor income. Armed with these
deﬁnitions, the following proposition derives the optimal income tax.

















 1 is the income-weighted average of the elasticity
"xt, x = l;q.
Proof. Substituting the Slutsky equations and the distributional characteristic (15) into the
ﬁrst-order condition for the income tax in equation (10), using the deﬁnitions for the elasticities
and rearranging the resulting equation yields the expression.

 is the price of one unit of environmental quality.  is the social cost of reducing aggregate
dirty consumption by one unit. By dividing through , the marginal value of public resources,
this utility cost is converted into monetary equivalents. The ratio

 can also be interpreted as
12Note that the covariance is negative only if the indirect income eﬀect does not result in increasing welfare
weights 

n. This possibility is assumed not to occur. At low tax rates, one can be sure that this holds true, see
also Kaplow (2008).
13The ambiguity in sign of this and all subsequently discussed cross-elasticities is formally derived in the
Appendix
14The text refers to Hicksian complements and substitutes, i.e., the signs of the cross-derivatives of the com-
pensated labor supply and consumption demand functions.
11the marginal rate of transformation of producing one unit of environmental quality per capita
(E=N). A reduction of aggregate dirty consumption by one unit improves the quality of the
environment by . Hence, 

 corresponds to the marginal external cost of one unit of aggregate
consumption of dirty commodities. The ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax thus equals 

.
The expression for the optimal linear income tax (16) demonstrates that the marginal dis-
tributional beneﬁts of the income tax (l) are equated with the sum of the marginal deadweight
loss in labor supply   t







1+ "qt. The labor tax rate increases with its redistributional beneﬁts (larger l).
It falls with the compensated labor supply elasticity (larger  "lt). If the demand for dirty goods
falls with a larger labor tax ("qt < 0), the income tax helps to internalize the environmental
externality, and should be set higher as long as the dirt tax is below the Pigouvian tax ( < 

).
However, if the dirt tax is above the Pigouvian tax ( > 

), a higher income tax exacerbates
the non-environmental distortion in consumption and should be set lower as a result. If "qt > 0,
the opposite reasoning holds.
4.3 Modiﬁed Pigouvian tax
To ﬁnd the optimal tax on the externality-generating good, the ﬁrst-order condition for the
dirt tax in equation (11) can be rewritten by introducing the Feldstein (1972)-distributional
characteristic of the dirty commodity:
Deﬁnition 4 The distributional characteristic of dirty goods consumption is










Generally, this normalized covariance cannot be signed, since it depends on how the demand
for dirty commodities covaries with the social welfare weights. If individuals with a high ability
(low ability) consume relatively more from the dirty good, the distributional characteristic is
positive (negative), i.e., q > 0 (q < 0).
The compensated elasticities of labor supply and dirty commodities with respect to the










qn < 0, respectively. Hence,
the direct tax elasticity of dirty consumption, "q, is unambiguously negative. However, the
cross-elasticity of labor supply cannot be signed unambiguously. If dirty consumption is com-
plementary to leisure, higher environmental taxes will encourage labor supply ("l > 0), while if
dirty consumption is a substitute for leisure, environmental taxes will discourage labor supply
("l < 0).

































 1 is the income-weighted average of the elasticity "x,
12x = l;q.
Proof. Substituting the Slutsky equations and the distributional characteristic (17) into the
ﬁrst-order condition for the commodity tax in equation (11), using the deﬁnitions for the elas-
ticities and rearranging the resulting equation yields the expression.
The expression for the optimal dirt tax in equation (18) equates the distributional beneﬁts
of the dirt tax (q) on the left-hand side with the marginal deadweight losses of the dirt tax
on the right-hand side. The latter consist of the deadweight loss in labor supply   t
1 t
"l
  , and








  > 0. Hence, dirt taxes increase
if they serve well as a redistributive device, i.e., if dirty goods are mainly consumed by the
high-ability types (i.e., when q is positive and large). Dirt taxes rise as well if the external cost
associated with environmental damage is large (i.e., 

 is large), and if the demand for dirty
consumption is not sensitive to the dirt tax (i.e., "q is small). The dirt tax may indirectly
aﬀect labor supply, depending on the complementarity of dirty goods with leisure. Dirt taxes
should be set lower when dirty goods are complementary to work ( "l > 0), but higher when
dirty goods are complementary to leisure ( "l < 0). In analogy of the modiﬁed Samuelson rule
for the optimal provision of public goods Atkinson and Stern (1974), the optimal second-best
corrective tax from (18) is labeled as the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax.
4.4 Modiﬁed Samuelson rule for optimal environmental quality
Finally, the optimal provision of environmental quality is derived. The distributional characte-
ristic of the environmental quality E is deﬁned as the normalized covariance between the social
marginal value of private income 
n and the marginal willingness to pay for the environment
uE
uc :
Deﬁnition 5 The distributional characteristic of environmental quality is














If mainly high-ability (low-ability) types beneﬁt from a better environmental quality, then
E > 0 (E < 0). E = 0 if environmental quality is distributionally neutral. In that case, social
welfare weights 
n are equal across individuals, or all individuals share the same willingness to
pay for a better environment uE
uc .
The compensated cross-elasticities of labor supply and dirty consumption with respect to










qn. If improvements in en-
vironmental quality raise (reduce) compensated labor supply, "lE > 0 ("lE > 0) is obtained.
Similarly, if compensated demand for dirty commodities increases with a higher (lower) envi-
ronmental quality, "qE > 0 ("qE > 0) is found.
























13where   (1   t)
R
N nlndF (n)=E measures the ratio of net labor income to environmental





 1 denotes the income-weighted average of
the elasticity "xE, x = l;q.
Proof. Substituting the Slutsky equations and the distributional characteristic (19) into the
ﬁrst-order condition for environmental quality in equation (12), using the deﬁnitions for the
elasticities and rearranging the resulting equation yields the expression.
Equation (20) gives a modiﬁed Samuelson rule for the provision of the environmental public
good. The left-hand side of equation (20) indicates the beneﬁts of a cleaner environment. It
is equal to the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between environmental quality and
consumption, i.e., the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for a cleaner environment. The
distributional characteristic of environmental quality deﬂates (inﬂates) the marginal beneﬁts if
mainly the rich (poor) beneﬁt from a better environmental quality, i.e., when E > 0 (E < 0).
The right-hand side of equation (20) gives the marginal cost of a cleaner environment. The
ﬁrst term,

, can be interpreted as the marginal rate of transformation of producing one unit of
environmental quality. If environmental quality is more costly to produce in terms of reducing
the consumption of dirty goods,

 increases. The second, and third terms on the right-hand
side of (20) reﬂect the direct impact of changes in the public good of environmental quality on,
respectively, labor supply and dirty consumption (cf. Atkinson and Stern (1974) and Jacobs
(2010) for ordinary public goods). If a better environmental quality reduces (increases) compen-
sated labor supply, i.e., "lE < 0 ("lE > 0), the marginal cost of providing a better environment
increases (decreases) as long as labor income is taxed. In that case, the government loses (gains)
tax revenues from the labor tax if the quality of the environment improves. Similarly, if a bet-
ter environment would reduce (increase) the compensated demand for dirty commodities, i.e.,
"qE < 0 ("qE > 0), the marginal cost of providing a better environment increases (decreases) if







Note that in the absence of distributional concerns, the ﬁrst-best policy rules for the environment
can be obtained.
Proposition 5 In the absence of distributional concerns, the marginal income tax rate is set to















Proof. In the absence of distributional concerns, all distributional characteristics are zero
(l = q = E = 0). Substitution in (16), (18) and (20) yields the results.
14Equation (22) is the uncorrected Samuelson rule for environmental quality stating that the
sum of the marginal rates of substitution should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation
of providing a better environment. This proposition demonstrates most clearly that positive
marginal tax rates on labor income are introduced only to redistribute income.
4.6 Optimal tax structure
The optimal tax structure of income and environmental taxes can be solved as functions of the
elasticities and distributional terms.



































Equations (23) and (24) give the optimal tax rates on labor and dirty consumption. The left-
hand side in equation (24) shows the environmental tax in deviation from its ﬁrst-best Pigouvian
rate. Hence, the right-hand side of (24) reﬂects the non-environmental role of the environmental
tax.
To gain some intuition for these expressions, suppose that dirty consumption and labor are
neither relative substitutes nor relative complements, i.e., when compensated consumption de-
mand and labor supply are independent ("qt = 0 and "l = 0). This requires a separable utility
function without income eﬀects. In that case, the optimal tax rates are determined by the ratios
of a distributional term (respectively l and  q) and the compensated tax elasticity (respecti-
vely,  "lt and  "q). Thus, tax rates increase with distributional concerns and decrease with
the compensated elasticities. This is the standard trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency, which
applies to both policy instruments.
The compensated cross-elasticities are generally not zero. This implies that two additional
terms determine optimal taxes. First, the second term in the denominators of both tax expres-
sions indicates whether the elasticity of the tax base of one tax instrument increases due to





in equation (23) captures the interaction
between the demand for dirty commodities and labor supply. For example, "qt
"l
 "q > 0 if
taxing dirty commodities reduces labor supply ("l < 0), and taxing labor income reduces de-
mand for dirty commodities ("qt < 0). Therefore, the less distortionary dirt taxes for labor
supply are, the more the elasticity of the labor tax base decreases, and the higher optimal labor





in equation (24) indicates whether the elasticity of






the income tax lowers the demand for dirty commodities ("qt < 0), and the dirt tax reduces
labor supply ("l < 0), a higher dirt tax mitigates the distortion of the labor tax on dirty
15goods consumption, and dirt taxes should be set higher, accordingly. The signs of the cross-
elasticities are generally ambiguous. Consequently, cross-substitution eﬀects could theoretically
either increase or decrease optimal tax rates on income or dirty consumption.
Second, the second term in the numerator of both tax expressions indicates whether one






in equation (23) is negative if dirty commodities are consumed more by
the aﬄuent (q > 0), and income taxes reduce the demand of dirty commodities ("qt < 0).
Consequently, a higher labor tax worsens the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency of the dirt
tax. As a result, the dirt tax loses its redistributive power, and the income tax should be lowered.
The reverse reasoning holds for the case in which dirty commodities are consumed by the poor
(q < 0) or if income taxes increase the demand for dirty commodities ("qt > 0). From the
numerator in equation (24) follows that dirt taxes improve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ for the
income tax if "l
l
 "lt > 0. If dirt taxes boost (reduce) labor supply, i.e., "l > 0 ("l < 0), then
it becomes more (less) attractive to ﬁght inequality with the income tax.
Important to note is that in equation (24) there is no correction for the marginal cost of
public funds. The optimal second-best environmental tax requires a correction for distributional
concerns and interactions with labor supply, but not for pre-existing tax distortions. Intuitively,
in the optimal tax system, the deadweight loss of a distortionary labor tax is exactly oﬀset by the
distributional gain of a more equal welfare distribution (or a better environmental quality). Since
the marginal cost of public funds equals one, the marginal unit of revenue is valued equally by the
government and the private sector. Hence, a better environmental quality no longer competes
with other public goods. This ﬁnding contrasts with models that assume a representative agent
(e.g. Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b)). These models have emphasized
that the interactions of environmental taxes with preexisting tax distortions push the optimal
second-best pollution tax below its ﬁrst-best level. This result also sheds a diﬀerent light on
the ﬁndings by Pirttilä (2000), who adopts the traditional concept for the social value of private
income. Using the Diamond measure for the social value of private income, the marginal cost of
public funds plays no role in the optimal rule for corrective taxes.
4.7 Conditions for ﬁrst-best rules in second-best
A special case can be derived where the optimal environmental tax in the second-best equals
the ﬁrst-best expression for the Pigouvian tax.
Proposition 6 If preferences are given by
un   (cn;qn)   h(ln) +  (E); c;q;h0; 0 > 0; cc;qq; h00; 00 < 0; 8n; (25)
where  (:) denotes total real consumption from clean and dirty commodities, and  (:) is a linear
homogeneous sub-utility function over clean and dirty commodities, then the optimal income tax
is given by t
1 t =
l
  "lt, the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax equals the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax,  = 

,







Proof. Marginal utility of income is constant, due to the homotheticity of  (:), which follows
from substitution of the ﬁrst-order condition
uq
uc = 1+ in the deﬁnition for n  uc. There-fore,
16uE
uc is constant, so that E = 0, cf. (19). Furthermore, "lt = n"l, which follows from totally
diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions (3), (4) and the utility function (1), and setting the
change in utility to zero in order to ﬁnd the compensated elasticities. Finally, it can be derived
that
R








N (1   
n)nnlndF(n), since
(1+)qn
(1 t)nln+T is constant with
homothetic preferences and using the ﬁrst-order condition for T from (9). Substitution of these
results in the ﬁrst-order conditions – equations (16), (18) and (12) – proves the proposition.
The preferences given in equation (25) are quasi-linear in total real consumption  (:), and in-
come eﬀects in labor supply are absent. Due to the homotheticity of sub-utility  (:), taxing dirty
commodities has no distributional advantage over taxing labor income. Intuitively, consumption
of dirty commodities is proportional to labor income. Hence, taxing dirty goods at a higher rate
than the Pigouvian tax yields no distributional gains, but results in larger labor market distor-
tions by distorting the composition of consumption, thereby harming non-environmental welfare.
Hence, dirt taxes are not used for distributional reasons. Similarly, dirt taxes cannot be used to
alleviate the tax burden on labor, since both clean and dirty goods are equally complementary to
leisure. Thus, the consumption tax imposes the same distortions on labor supply as the income
tax, while it introduces additional distortions in the optimal composition of consumption. These
distortions can be avoided by not taxing dirty commodities at a diﬀerent rate than the Pigouvian
rate.15 Naturally, optimal allocations diﬀer between ﬁrst-best and second-best settings.
This example most clearly illustrates why it is misleading to ignore distributional concerns in
second-best tax analysis. The assumptions on preferences in equation (25) are similar to those
in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b). They ﬁnd that the optimal second-best Pigouvian
tax should be corrected for the marginal cost of funds. However, this paper shows that this
correction disappears in the presence of redistributional concerns.
5 Optimal non-linear environmental taxation
This section derives the optimal non-linear taxes on income and polluting consumption goods.
The government can observe only the total labor income of an individual, zn  nln, but cannot
observe either labor supply ln, or ability n. Therefore, individualized lump-sum taxes are ruled
out. Moreover, the government is assumed to be able to verify consumption of polluting goods
at the individual level. Hence, a non-linear commodity tax can be levied. The non-linear income
tax schedule is designated by T(zn). The marginal tax rate is T0 (zn)  dT (zn)=dzn. The
non-linear tax on the dirty commodity is given by (qn), where 0(qn)  d(qn)=dqn stands
for the marginal commodity tax. The individual’s optimization problem is not aﬀected, except
that non-linear marginal tax rates replace the linear ones in the ﬁrst-order conditions for utility
maximization. The social welfare function remains identical as well.
To determine the non-linear policy schedules T (:) and  (:), a standard mechanism-design
approach is employed. First, making use of the revelation principle, the optimal direct mecha-
nism is derived, which induces individuals to reveal their ability truthfully through self-selection.
This direct mechanism yields the optimal second-best allocation. Then, this allocation is de-
centralized as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium by employing the non-linear policy
15A version of this utility function is employed by Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2010) in a dynamic framework
with stochastic environmental damages and the optimal setting of environmental and income taxes.
17instruments.
Any second-best allocation must satisfy the resource- and incentive-compatibility constraints.




(zn   cn   qn)dF(n) = R: (26)
If the government maximizes social welfare subject to the resource constraint, and all individuals
respect their budget constraints, the government budget constraint is automatically satisﬁed by
Walras’ law.
Since n is not observable by the government, every bundle fcn;qn;zng for individual n must
be such that individual n does not want to have another bundle fcm;qm;zmg intended for
individual m 6= n. If utility is written as u(cn;qn;ln;E) = u(cn;qn; zn
n ;E)  U(cn;qn;zn;E;n),
then incentive compatibility requires
U(cn;qn;zn;E;n)  U(cm;qm;zm;E;n); 8m 2 N;8n 2 N: (27)








After integrating the incentive-compatibility constraint by parts, the Lagrangian for maximizing


































dn + nun   nun;
where n is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the diﬀerential equation for utility (28).
Intuitively, n equals the marginal increase in social welfare of redistributing one unit of income
from individuals above n to individuals below n.  is the Lagrangian multiplier on the economy’s
resource constraint. As before,  measures the marginal social value of public resources. The
transversality conditions for this control problem are given by
lim
n!n
n = 0; lim
n!n
n = 0: (30)
16This is a valid procedure only if second-order conditions for utility maximisation are fulﬁlled at the optimum




dn > 0) and strictly non-





see Appendix for a formal proof. In the remainder it is assumed that these conditions are always met.
185.1 Optimal redistribution

















































> 0 is the compensated labor-supply elasticity.


























 q; u;  E
!
= 0; 8n: (32)
Totally diﬀerentiating the utility function at constant dirty goods consumption, utility and
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is equal to 1
uc(:). This equation is a ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation in n.






















Substitution of (35) in (33) yields (31).
This expression is identical to Mirrlees (1971). At each point in the income distribution,
the government trades oﬀ imposing the distortions of a higher marginal tax rate against its
distributional gains. If the compensated labor supply elasticity "n is larger, the optimal tax rate
should be lower. This conforms to standard Ramsey intuition. If the taxed labor base is larger,
nf(n) is higher, and the welfare losses increase, because more individuals or individuals with
higher wages are aﬀected by higher marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rates should be higher
if the marginal value of redistribution (expressed in money units) nn
 increases. The marginal
value of redistribution n is zero at the end points of the skill distribution. In the absence of
bunching at zero labor eﬀort, the marginal tax rate is zero at the bottom of the skill distribution.
The intuition is that it is not optimal to distort the labor supply for the lowest-skilled person if
19there is no one below that person who beneﬁts from redistribution. If there is bunching at zero
labor supply, the marginal tax rate at the bottom is positive, see Seade (1977) and Ebert (1992).
Positive marginal tax rates then help to redistribute income from individuals with positive labor
supply to individuals with zero labor earnings. Similarly, if the skill distribution is bounded,
the marginal tax rate at the top should be zero. Intuitively, it makes no sense to distort labor
supply of the highest-skilled individual, since there will be no one contributing to redistribution
above him, cf. Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977). However, if the skill distribution is Pareto, then
the top rate does not converge to zero, see also Diamond (1998), and Saez (2001). The reader
is referred to Mirrlees (1971), Seade (1977), Tuomala (1984), Diamond (1998), and Saez (2001)
for further discussion of the optimal non-linear income tax. Note that the expression for the
optimal non-linear income tax does not depend on the presence of the externality.
The non-linear income tax does not provide a direct measure for the marginal cost of public
funds. To determine the marginal cost of public funds, the welfare eﬀect of a unit-increase in
the intercept  T (0) of the tax function is analyzed. In particular, each tax payer is provided
with one unit of extra income. This is equivalent to an increase in the lump-sum transfer of one
unit of income under the linear tax schedule. This method is also employed by Saez (2001) and
Jacquet et al. (2010).
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Proof. Raising  T (0) by one unit has the following three eﬀects. First, the government loses N
units of resources. Second, this policy mechanically raises social welfare – measured in monetary
equivalents – for each individual by 	0n
 . Third, a larger  T (0) generates behavioral changes in
labor supply and demand for polluting commodities. Since marginal tax rates are unaﬀected by
this policy reform, substitution eﬀects are zero and only the income eﬀects matter. The income
eﬀect in labor supply changes tax revenues by T0 (zn) @zn
@( T(0)) = T0 (zn)n @ln
@( T(0)). Moreover, a
larger lump-sum transfer generates an income eﬀect on the demand for polluting goods, which
both raises tax revenues by 0 (qn) and lowers environmental welfare by 

 per unit of polluting
consumption. The combined eﬀect is






@( T(0)). The total change in welfare should



















dF (n) = N:
Rewriting yields the desired result.
At the optimum, the marginal cost of public funds for all tax instruments must be equali-
zed. Since  T (0) is equivalent to a non-distortionary non-individualized lump-sum tax, at the
optimum the marginal cost of public funds for all other tax rates must be equal to the marginal
cost of public funds of  T (0). Thus, at each point in the income distribution, tax distortions
should be equal to distributional and/or environmental gains for all marginal tax rates.
205.2 Modiﬁed Pigouvian tax
Proposition 9 The optimal non-linear tax on polluting commodities is given by
0 (qn)   


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+ ulq
!
= 0; 8n: (38)








Use this result and the individual ﬁrst-order condition (
uq
uc = 1 + 0 (qn)) to ﬁnd the desired
result.
Again, the optimal corrective tax does not depend on measures for the marginal cost of
public funds. Environmental taxes could be useful for non-environmental reasons, i.e., to reduce
labor market distortions. The environmental tax optimally deviates from the Pigouvian level if
this helps to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint associated with income redistribution.
If
@ ln(uq=uc)
@ lnln > 0 (< 0), then the marginal willingness to pay for the dirty commodity increases
(decreases) with labor supply. Consequently, individuals with a higher ability are less tempted
to mimic those with lower ability, since the commodity tax boosts labor supply. Hence, the





). Thus, the environmental tax alleviates some of the tax-induced distortions of
the income tax on labor supply.
In contrast to linear taxes, environmental taxes are not directly used for redistributional rea-
sons. If there are no other sources of heterogeneity than in skills, the non-linear income tax is the
informationally most eﬃcient instrument to redistribute income, which renders indirect instru-
ments for redistribution redundant. Intuitively, indirect instruments cannot redistribute more
income than the income tax, but introduce additional distortions by distorting the composition
of consumption demands.17
The following proposition states the condition under which Pigouvian, ﬂat rate pollution
taxes are optimal.
Proposition 10 If the utility function is weakly separable between labor and private commodi-
ties, i.e., u(h(cn;qn);ln;E), then the optimal marginal environmental tax in second-best equals





Proof. If u(h(cn;qn);ln;E), it is immediately established that
@ ln(uq=uc)
@ lnln = 0. Hence, the
right-hand side of (37) is zero.
17However, this result disappears if there is also preference heterogeneity, see also Saez (2002). If the willingness
to pay for dirty commodities (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of dirty and clean commodities) correlates
with skills, dirt taxes (or subsidies) should also be employed for redistributional reasons.
21Thus, with the relatively weak assumption that consumption of both commodities is weakly
separable from leisure, the optimal second-best policy rule for environmental taxation is identical
to the optimal ﬁrst-best policy rule. The intuition is that environmental taxes are used neither
for redistribution nor to improve eﬃciency only to internalize the environmental externality.18
Moreover, the optimal marginal environmental tax is constant, i.e., ﬂat, in the case in which labor
supply is weakly separable from clean and dirty commodities – even though the environmental
tax is allowed to be non-linear. The intuition is twofold. First, the marginal social damage of
the pollution from consuming one unit of the dirty commodity, , is constant across skill types.
Second, diﬀerentiated commodity taxes do not help to raise social welfare by indirectly reducing
the distortions of the labor income tax.
The term
@ ln(uq=uc)
@ lnln can be rewritten to relate the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax to empirically




= !l (ql   cl); (40)
where !l 
 ulln
u > 0 is the utility share of labor supply and ql 
uqlu
uqul and cl 
uclu
ucul are Hicks’
partial elasticities of complementarity between labor and dirty or clean goods in the utility









uq and cl  @uc
@ln
ln
uc denote the elasticities of the marginal utility of dirty and
clean goods with respect to labor supply. Empirical estimation of the parameters of the utility
function therefore makes it possible to test whether environmental taxes should be set above or
below the Pigouvian level.
5.3 Modiﬁed Samuelson rule environmental quality
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dn = 0: (43)
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dF(n) can be interpreted as the ‘virtual tax’ on the provision of environmen-
18Browning and Meghir (1991) and Crawford et al. (2010) empirically reject weak separability for the UK.
Some externality-generating goods are found to be leisure complements (domestic fuels), while others are leisure
substitutes (motor fuels). Pirttilä and Suoniemi (2010) ﬁnd that a joint expenditure category of housing and
energy consumption is a leisure complement in Finland.
22tal quality relative to the ﬁrst-best policy rule. That is, environmental quality is overprovided






, if the willingness to pay for a cleaner
environment rises with labor supply:
@ ln(uE=uc)
@ lnln > 0. Similarly, environmental quality is un-






, if the individual’s marginal
willingness to pay for a cleaner environment falls with his/her labor eﬀort, i.e.,
@ ln(uE=uc)
@ lnln < 0.
Intuitively, in the second-best with labor market distortions, the government employs environ-
mental quality to indirectly alleviate these distortions by underproviding leisure complements or
overproviding leisure substitutes – relative to the ﬁrst-best policy rule. Again, a higher (lower)
environmental quality can help to relax the incentive constraints, if a higher (lower) environmen-
tal quality boosts labor supply. In that case, individuals with a higher ability are less tempted
to mimic those with lower ability by boosting their labor supply.
Note that the ordinary Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of environmental quality
results if the marginal willingness to pay for the environment does not depend on labor supply,
i.e.,
@ ln(uE=uc)










That is, the sum of the marginal rates of substitution of better environmental quality should be
equal to the marginal rate of transformation of better environmental quality. Hence, with the
relatively weak assumption that consumption and environmental quality are weakly separable
from leisure, the optimal second-best policy rule for environmental quality is identical to the
optimal ﬁrst-best policy rule. The intuition is again that the provision of environmental quality
neither is useful to redistribute more income nor to alleviate income tax distortions on labor
supply.
5.4 First-best Pigouvian tax and environmental quality in second-best
The ﬁndings of this paper reveal that if environmental taxes are set at the Pigouvian level, see
(39), this does not automatically imply that the optimal level of environmental quality follows the
standard ﬁrst-best decision rule in (42). Similarly, if environmental quality follows the ﬁrst-best
Samuelson rule, as in (44), this does not automatically imply that the optimal environmental tax
coincides with the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax, see (37). Whether they coincide or not depends on
the preference structure of individuals. In the second-best, indirect policies are employed if they
help to reduce tax distortions on labor supply. However, it can be derived that the ﬁrst-best
rules for environmental taxes and environmental quality are applicable in second-best settings
if the utility function is weakly separable between labor and all other commodities (including
environmental quality).
Proposition 12 If utility can be written as u(h(cn;qn;E);ln), the optimal modiﬁed Pigouvian















@ lnln = 0. Substi-
tution in (37) and (42) yields the result.
236 Policy implications
The results of this paper have important policy implications. In particular, if the marginal cost
of public funds is equal to one, public resources are equally as scarce as private resources are. Ac-
cordingly, the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax and the optimal provision of environmental quality should
not depend on the marginal cost of public funds in the second-best. Therefore, environmental
taxes should mainly be levied for their impact on environmental welfare.19
Another implication is that, in the optimal tax system, the revenue-raising capacity of envi-
ronmental policy instruments does not make them superior compared to revenue-neutral instru-
ments (such as regulation) or revenue-reducing instruments (such as subsidies on non-polluting
commodities). Intuitively, the optimal second-best allocation is independent of the way in which
this allocation is implemented. Price instruments, such as environmental taxes, can sustain the
second-best allocation equally as well as quantity controls, regulation or auctions. The reason
is that the fundamental informational constraint – ability is private information – cannot be
relaxed by simply adopting a diﬀerent policy instrument. Only if one policy instrument has ad-
ditional costs or beneﬁts over another instrument, can one discriminate between the desirability
of various instruments. Thus, one needs to include additional constraints in the analysis in order
to assess the desirability of various environmental policy instruments.20
As a corollary, the ﬁndings of this paper also cast a new light on the ‘double-dividend’ hypo-
thesis pioneered by Oates (1991) and Pearce (1991). These authors argued that environmental
taxes could both improve the environment and allow for a reduction in distortionary labor taxes.
Subsequently, a large literature emerged exploring the conditions under which such a double di-
vidend would indeed be feasible.21 However, if the marginal cost of public funds equals one in
the optimal tax system, then it is irrelevant whether environmental taxes raise revenue to cut
labor taxes. Hence, the issue of the double dividend of environmental taxes has become moot.
If markets or governments fail, it is no longer guaranteed that the marginal cost of funds
is one. The extensive environmental tax literature has demonstrated that if governments fail
to set optimal taxes (e.g. by letting ﬁxed factors go untaxed or by setting sub-optimal non-
environmental taxes/subsidies), it is no longer clear in which direction optimal second-best en-
vironmental taxes should be modiﬁed compared to the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax, see, for example,
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994a), de Mooij and Bovenberg (1998), and Ligthart and van der
Ploeg (1999). The literature also provides examples in which markets fail (e.g. due to involun-
tary unemployment), see also Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), Koskela and Schöb (1999)
and Holmlund and Kolm (2000). Also in this case, the marginal cost of public funds diﬀers from
unity, and the implications for how the modiﬁed Pigouvian tax should be set are ambiguous. See
also Goulder (1995), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), Bovenberg (1999), Sandmo (2000), Goulder
19Naturally, under non-separable preferences, modiﬁed Pigouvian taxes and the modiﬁed Samuelson rule for
environmental quality should take into account the relative complementarity of dirty consumption goods and
environmental quality with leisure.
20Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) demonstrate that environmental policies can create scarcity rents. The go-
vernment can skim oﬀ these rents without distortions by using either revenue-raising instruments (e.g. a tax or
auctioning permits) or a proﬁt tax. As long as a pure proﬁt tax is available, instrument equivalence is obtained.
In our model, environmental policy does not give rise to scarcity rents.
21See for surveys of this literature, e.g., Goulder (1995), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), Bovenberg (1999),
Sandmo (2000), Goulder and Bovenberg (2002), and Fullerton et al. (2010)
24and Bovenberg (2002) and Fullerton et al. (2010) for extensive discussions of these arguments.
In order to analyze the impact of government or market failures on optimal environmental
taxes, one should explicitly model these government and market failures from ﬁrst principles, and
not impose them in an ad hoc fashion. This paper reveals that restricting the initial tax code,
for reasons that do not originate endogenously from technological or informational constraints,
can have profound eﬀects on optimal policy rules in the second-best. This should be true in
more general settings as well. Once government and market failures are explicitly modeled, the
marginal cost of public funds should probably not diﬀer from one at an optimal tax system,
since otherwise the tax system would not have been optimal.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that it is erroneous to adjust the optimal second-best policy rule for internali-
zing environmental externalities for the marginal cost of public funds. The optimal second-best
environmental tax does generally depend on the complementarity of labor with dirty commo-
dities and with environmental quality. When linear taxes are employed, second-best pollution
taxes also depend on the distributional impact of the dirt tax. Under non-linear commodity and
income taxation, however, the optimal second-best commodity tax is independent of distributio-
nal concerns. If utility is weakly separable between consumption and labor, and the government
can levy non-linear income and environmental taxes, then the second-best environmental tax
is equal to the Pigouvian tax. When linear instruments are considered, sub-utility over dirty
consumption goods and leisure needs to be homothetic, and income eﬀects need to be absent in
individual choices in order to obtain the optimal Pigouvian tax in the second-best.
Appendix
Second-order incentive compatibility
This appendix derives the conditions under which the ﬁrst-order approach yields an allocation
that respects second-order conditions for an optimal allocation, see also Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1991). Deﬁne the net utility 
(m;n) of an n-type mimicking an m-type as 
(m;n) 
U(cm;qm;zm;E;n)   U(cn;qn;zn;E;n). Under the direct mechanism, each individual reports
an ability type to the government. Each report m is associated with a commodity bundle














@m2  0. This second-order condition can be simpliﬁed in a number






@m@n = 0. Diﬀeren-
















































































































dn  0, and dzn
dn  0. Thus, in the optimal
mechanism both zn and qn should be non-decreasing in n, and two Spence-Mirrlees conditions
on the marginal rates of substitution for goods and for labor supply are required.
Compensated elasticities
This appendix formally derives the compensated elasticities under alternative speciﬁcations for
the utility function. It demonstrates that the compensated cross-elasticities of the utility function
are generally ambiguous.
This appendix starts from a general speciﬁcation of utility. For notational simplicity, the
ability-indices n are omitted and environmental quality is suppressed in the utility function as
it remains constant for the individual:
u(c;q;v); uc;uq;uv > 0; ucc;uqq;uvv < 0: (46)
The time endowment equals one so that l  1   v denotes labor supply. For later reference,
  l=v is deﬁned as the labor-leisure ratio. The individual budget constraint is given by:
c + (1 + )q = (1   t)n(1   v): (47)
Maximization of utility gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC’s): uv
uc = (1   t)n and
uq
uc = 1 + .
The model is log-linearized around an initial equilibrium. A tilde (~) designates a relative
change, for example, ~ c  dc=c, except for the relative changes in taxes that are deﬁned as:
~   d
1+ and ~ t  dt
1 t. To ﬁnd the compensated elasticities, the utility function is log-linearized
at a ﬁxed level of utility (~ u = 0). For the general form of the utility function, the linearized ﬁrst-
order conditions can be written as: (cv + cc)!c~ c (vv + cv)!v~ v +(vq   cq)!q~ q =  ~ t, and
(cq + cc)!c~ c + (vq   cv)!v~ v   (qq + cq)!q~ q = ~ , where !c  ucc
u , !q 
uqq
u and !v  uvv
u
are the utility shares of clean consumption, dirty consumption, and leisure, respectively. cc 
 uccu
u2
c , qq   
uqqu
u2
q , vv   uvvu
u2
v , cv  ucvu
ucuv, cq 
ucqu
ucuq, and vq 
uvqu
uvuq designate Hick’s partial
elasticities of complementarity. Together with the linearized utility function !c~ c+!q~ q+!v~ v = 0,
these three equations can be solved in terms of the changes in the policy variables only (not
shown). It is then established that the compensated ‘own’ price elasticities are always negative
and the compensated cross-elasticities are ambiguous in sign. For three diﬀerent CES nestings
the remainder of this appendix explicitly derives the signs of the elasticities.
Nested CES I: u(x(c;q);v)
Assume that utility is a nested CES function according to u(x(c;q);v), where u(:) and x(:)
are linear homogeneous (and therefore homothetic) functions exhibiting a constant elasticity
of substitution equal to  and , respectively. Log-linearize the utility function to keep utility
ﬁxed yields: !x~ x + !v~ v = 0, where !x  uxx
u , and !v  uvv
u . Log-linearize sub-utility to
ﬁnd: ~ x = !xc~ c + !xq~ q, where !xc = xcc
x , and !xq =
xqq
x . Linear homogeneity implies that
26!xc +!xq = 1 and !x +!v = 1. Log-linearize the FOC’s to ﬁnd ~ c  ~ q = ~ , 1
 (~ x   ~ v) =  ~ t+ ~ xc,
and ~ xc = xccc
xc ~ c +
xcqq
xc ~ q =
!xq
 (~ q   ~ c), where xccc =  xcqq and  1 =
xcqx
xcxq are used. Hence,
~ x ~ v =  ~ t+!xq

 (~ q   ~ c). Combine the expressions to get the compensated demand equations
~ v = !x!xq~  + !x~ t, and ~ q =  (!v!xq + !xc) ~    !v~ t. The compensated elasticities are
therefore given by "q   (!v!xq + !xc) < 0, "qt   !v < 0, "l    1
!x!xq < 0, and
"lt    1
!x < 0.
Nested CES II: u(x(c;v);q)
Assume that utility is a nested CES function according to u(x(c;v);q), where u(:) and x(:)
are linear homogeneous (and therefore homothetic) functions exhibiting a constant elasticity
of substitution equal to  and , respectively. Log-linearize the utility function to keep utility
ﬁxed yields: !x~ x + !q~ q = 0, where !x  uxx
u , and !q 
uqq
u . Log-linearize sub-utility to ﬁnd:
~ x = !xc~ c+!xv~ v, where !xc = xcc
x , and !xv = xvv
x . Linear homogeneity implies that !xc+!xv = 1
and !x + !q = 1. Log-linearize the FOC’s: ~ x   ~ q = ~  + ~ xc, ~ c   ~ v =  ~ t, ~ xc = xccc
xc ~ c + xcvv
xc ~ v =
!xv
 (~ v   ~ c), where xccc =  xcvv and  1 = xcvx
xcxv are used. Hence, ~ x   ~ q = ~  + !xv

 (~ v   ~ c).
Combine the expressions to get the demand equations: ~ v = !q~  + (!q!xv + !xc)~ t, and
~ q =  !x~    !x!xv~ t. The compensated elasticities are therefore given by "q   !x < 0,
"qt   !x!xv < 0, "l    1
!q < 0, and "lt    1
 (!xc + !q!xv) < 0.
Nested CES III: u(x(q;v);c)
Assume that utility is a nested CES function according to u(x(q;v);c), where u(:) and x(:)
are linear homogeneous (and therefore homothetic) functions exhibiting a constant elasticity
of substitution equal to  and , respectively. Log-linearize the utility function to keep utility
ﬁxed yields: !x~ x + !c~ c = 0, where !x  uxx
u , and !c  ucc
u . Log-linearize sub-utility to
ﬁnd: ~ x = !xq~ q + !xv~ v, where !xq =
xqq
x , and !xv = xvv
x . Linear homogeneity implies that
!xq + !xv = 1 and !x + !c = 1. Log-linearize the FOC’s: ~ c   ~ x =  ~ xq + ~ , ~ q   ~ v =
 
 
~ t + ~ 

, ~ xq =
xqqq
xq ~ q +
xqvv
xq ~ v = !xv
 (~ v   ~ q), where xqqq =  xqvv and  1 =
xqvx
xqxv are used.
Hence, ~ c   ~ x = ~  + !xv

 (~ q   ~ v). Combine the expressions to get the demand equations:
~ v = !xq (   !c) ~  + (!c!xv + !xq)~ t, and ~ q =  (!xv + !c!xq) ~  + !xv (!c   )~ t. The
compensated elasticities are therefore given by "q   (!xv + !c!xq) < 0, "qt  !xv (!c   ),
"l    1
!xq (   !c), and "lt    1
 (!c!xv + !xq) < 0.
Cobb-Douglas
With a Cobb-Douglas utility function, all the substitution elasticities in the nested CES-structures
equal one. Hence, they are all equivalent and ~ c+~ v+~ q = 0, where   ucc
u ,   uvv
u , and  =
uqq
u denote the utility shares. The compensated elasticities are thus given by: "q   (1 ) < 0,
"qt    < 0, "l    1
(1   ) < 0, and "lt    1
 < 0.
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